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Introduction
In all economic problems where market failure arises economists typically ask two questions: first, what do efficient allocations look like, and secondly, how can these allocations be implemented through decentralized decision-making. This procedure also applies to problems in the optimal management of fish stocks. The workhorse model for answering these questions is the biomass (or lumped-parameter) model, which describes the dynamics of a fish stock in terms of its biomass (Gordon 1954 , Scott 1955 , Clark 1990 . This model has often been criticized for oversimplifying biological structures and thus for generating inadequate management recommendations.
1 The crucial weakness of the surplus-production model is that it is incapable of distinguishing between two aspects of overfishing: recruitment overfishing and growth overfishing. Recruitment overfishing refers to the problem of low reproduction, because the spawning stock is has been fished down. Growth overfishing, by contrast, means that fish are caught at an inefficiently low age and weight class. In order to distinguish between these two forms of overfishing and hence formulate better management rules, it is necessary to look at the cohort or age structure of a given fish population.
In this paper we study how both problems, recruitment overfishing and growth overfishing, can be solved by means of incentive-based policy instruments. We first study optimal harvesting by asking which age classes should be harvested at all and what are the optimal amounts of catch for each age class. For this purpose we set up a simple dynamic cohort model with four age classes: eggs and larvae, juveniles, young fish at edible size but non-spawning age, and mature fish at spawning age. Only the young and mature fish are subject to potential harvest. We 3 consider selective fishing technology, which means that fishermen target the young and mature age groups independently. We use the concept of fishing technology in a broad sense in that fishermen may choose different types fishing gear and the time and location of harvest. Thus, fishermen's selective harvesting options are richer than the regulator's options for imposing selective harvesting by means of command-and-control.
Based on the results on optimal harvesting we ask how optimal management can be implemented by means of incentive-based economic instruments such as fees or tradable quotas.
We show that fixing the total allowable catch (TAC) and issuing tradable quotas 2 , measured in terms of biomass, an instrument that is currently used in many fisheries 3 is bound to fail as a solution for the problem of growth overfishing. This may be one reason why in most fisheries tradable quotas are complemented by gear restrictions (such as minimum mesh-size) or minimum landing-size. In this paper we focus on the design of economic instruments that can implement first-best, age-structured harvesting more easily. We show that a single TAC and tradable quotas measured in terms of the number of fish rather than in terms of biomass implements the first-best harvesting rule if natural survival rates of the different age classes subject to harvesting are identical. If natural survival rates differ with age, the instrument has to be modified slightly: the quotas for different age classes have to be traded at a fixed "exchange rate" that depends on the ratio of survival rates, and the TAC has to be adjusted accordingly. Furthermore we show how a 2 In accordance with our focus, we study how a system of tradable quotas could prevent growth overfishing.
Since we do not study the effects of long-term use rights in fisheries, we refrain from using the term "individual transferable quotas (ITQs)" in this context. 4 related price-based instrument in terms of harvesting fees can also implement the first-best harvesting rule. With the economic instruments we propose, additional regulations in terms of gear restrictions (such as mesh-size prescriptions) or minimum landing-sizes are obsolete.
Finally, to quantify both the total allowable catch and the quota price for a real fish population, we apply our model and analysis to the case of the Eastern Baltic cod fishery.
The number of previous bio-economic studies of age-structured fisheries is still rather small, although such models have been developed and analyzed since the 1970s (Hannesson 1975 , Reed 1980 , Getz and Haight 1989 , Clark 1990 . Recently, Tahvonen (2008 Tahvonen ( , 2009a b; c) has significantly advanced the analysis of optimal harvesting age-structured fish stocks. He in particular studies the effects of different types of gear selectivity. One type is "knife-edge" selectivity (Beverton and Holt 1957) . This means that all age classes above a certain age are subject to fishing mortality, while all younger and smaller fish completely escape. The other type is non-selective fishing gear, which implies that all age classes are harvested in fixed (but not necessarily equal) proportions. With non-selective gear, the optimal harvesting strategy may be "pulse-fishing", where all fish are harvested at certain points in time with no fishing in between.
The present paper differs from the previous studies by considering a perfectly selective fishing technology (in the broad sense discussed above) and by also suggesting new incentive-based policy instruments to decentralize optimal harvesting rules of age structured fish populations .
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present the bio-economic model comprising four age classes and an age-selective fishing technology. In Section 3 we derive general results on the structure of optimal age-structured harvesting rules and in Section 4 we show how these can be implemented by means of economic instruments. In Section 5 we apply the model to the case of Eastern Baltic cod fishery. The final section concludes. assumed to be sufficiently small for them not to be subject to fishing mortality. In principle these two age classes could be lumped together in one class; we keep them separate to avoid time lags of different lengths. Age class I consists of immature, non-spawning fish that are sufficiently large to be of commercial value. Age class M consists of all mature fish that are three years and older. This age class is the spawning stock.
In a single time period (a year) four events occur in the following order: In the first step mature fish spawn, and in the second step fishermen harvest. In the third step, natural mortality further reduces the stocks of all classes, and finally somatic growth of individual fish takes place. 4 To describe the population dynamics, we start with recruitment. The stock of age-class 0 (eggs and larvae) in year X . An example of such a non-linear recruitment function is the Ricker function that we use in the case study (Section 4).
Only age classes 2 and 3 are subject to fishing mortality, while all age classes are subject to natural mortality, which is assumed to be fixed and independent of the density of the fish 
The equations of motion describing the dynamics of the age-structured fish stock subject to harvesting are
The equilibrium properties of models with a similar structure (density-dependent recruitment and density-independent natural mortality) and the conditions for maximum sustainable yields have been analyzed by Reed (1980) . Here we focus on economically optimal harvesting and dynamics, and we investigate how first-best harvesting rules can be implemented by economic management instruments. For this purpose, we now turn to the economic part of the bio-economic model. 
Harvesting and profit
As mentioned above, we assume that fishermen can perfectly select the age class they are In order to determine optimal harvesting of the age-structured fish stock, we consider a central planner who determines the escapements of both age classes optimally. The planner's objective is to maximize the present value of annual profits discounted at a constant factor (0,1) 6 . The intertemporal objective function is thus given by 
Conditions for optimal economic management
The necessary conditions for the optimal harvesting of the age-structured fish stock are 
The first-order necessary conditions for optimal harvesting are 7 The lower limit 0 describes a fish stock with strong schooling behavior, while the upper limit 1 describes a highly dispersed fish stock (Hannesson 1983 
Analysis of these conditions leads to a number of clear-cut results about optimal harvesting and management of the age-structured fish stock, to be discussed in the following two sections. A first set of results (presented in Section 3) characterizes optimal harvesting of the age-structured fish population under different conditions on biological parameters, costs and prices. The second set of results (presented in Section 4) show how optimal management of the age-structured fish population can be decentralized by using suitable economic instruments.
Optimal harvesting structure
In our first result on optimal harvesting we show that under reasonable assumptions on market prices, harvest costs, and survival rates, optimal escapement of immature (age class I ) is larger than optimal escapement of mature fish (age class M ). For both age classes, optimal escapement is governed by the trade-off between current benefit of immediate harvesting and future benefits in terms of next periods' harvest and increased recruitment. The trade-off is different for the two age classes mainly because current benefits differ. Mature fish are usually much larger than young fish, and often have a higher market price per kilogram. Thus, revenues are greater for mature than for immature fish. If harvesting cost functions are similar for both age classes, this implies that the current benefit of immediate harvesting is higher for mature than for immature fish. Future benefits are the same for both age classes, as immature fish become mature and thus contribute to the next period's spawning stock, just as the surviving mature fish. The weight of future benefits in the trade-off may be different for both age classes as natural survival rates may differ with age. Since volatility of survival rates is typically low, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a higher benefit from escapement of immature fish than of mature fish.
Formally, we can state our first result as follows. Since all fish of three years and older are grouped in the stock of mature fish, the number of mature fish may well be larger than the number of immature fish in the same year. If this is the case, Proposition 1 implies that the optimal number of immature fish harvested must be smaller than that of mature fish.
Our next result on optimal harvesting states that optimal harvest (and therefore the optimal TAC) of immature fish is always zero if harvesting cost are independent of stock sizes, i.e. if 0 , and if the conditions on prices, cost parameter, and survival rates apply as discussed before. This is because for stock-independent harvesting cost, the trade-off between current and future benefits is independent of the level of escapement. It is then always better to let all of the immature fish grow, become mature and spawn, and to harvest mature fish only. This is formally stated in the following proposition. (5) and (6) For schooling fish such as the North Sea herring, Bjorndal (1988) finds the harvesting cost
to be approximately independent of stock size (see also Hannesson 1983 ). For such fisheries, complete escapement, i.e. zero harvest, of immature fish is optimal under the conditions discussed above. For many fisheries, however, it is more plausible that harvesting costs decrease with stock sizes. Therefore, our next result on optimal harvesting provides a condition, under which zero harvest of immature fish is optimal when harvesting cost decrease with the stock size. One general conclusion from these results is that optimal harvest quantities of immature and mature fish differ. Thus to implement the optimal harvesting policy through quota setting (TAC), different TACs would have to be used for the two age classes. A second general conclusion is that corner solutions with a zero TAC for immature fish may well be optimal, depending on biological parameters (survival rates and body-weight growth rates), but also on prices and cost parameters. In theory, a zero TAC for immature fish could be implemented by a gear regulation that excludes the harvesting of two-year-old fish. Practically, however, such a policy is not easy to implement, because it would require the regulator to prescribe a certain knife-edge selectivity of fishing gear. However, most specific types of fishing gear select only imperfectly for age.
Decentralization through incentive-based policy instruments
In this section we study how optimal harvesting structures as characterized above can be decentralized by implementing incentive-based policy instruments such as harvesting fees and tradable harvesting quotas. 8 Starting with harvesting fees, it is intuitive to guess that two harvesting fees are necessary to achieve the first best harvesting structure: one on the number of immature another one on the number of mature fish harvested. These fees capture the marginal opportunity costs of harvesting in terms of foregone future benefits of the stock of mature fish,
i.e. next periods' harvest and increased recruitment. In general, two different harvesting fees are needed, as the age-specific survival rates may differ, and thus the rates at which escapement of immature and mature fish contribute to the next period's spawning stock. Harvesting fees exhibit two features rendering them the more attractive instrument compared with a set of different agespecific TACs. First, since the fees differ only by the constant survival rates IM b and MM b , the ratio of the fees is always constant even on the transitional path into a steady state. Second, no explicit distinction between an "interior" solution with positive harvesting quantities and a "corner" solution with zero harvest (complete escapement) of immature fish is necessary. The reason is that in the latter case the optimal harvesting fee for immature fish exceeds the marginal 8
In the literature on fisheries, price-based instruments are frequently referred to as "landing fees". We prefer to use the term "harvesting fees", as the source of market failure is not the landing but the harvesting. Since harvested fish may be discarded rather than landed, a landing fee may not be the appropriate instrument for implementing optimal management.
profit of harvesting the first fish. . This implies that a uniform biomass fee induces a considerable distortion towards over-harvesting of immature fish. Put differently, the optimal fee per kilogram of immature fish would have to be higher than the optimal fee per kilogram of mature fish. It is easy to see that also for the case of different survival rates, a "biomass" harvesting fee will also induce a distortion towards over-harvesting of immature fish.
Next we study tradable harvesting quotas as the corresponding quantity-based economic instrument. Similar to management by fees, the important difference to traditional management systems is that both the total allowable catch and the quotas are measured in numbers of fish rather than in units of biomass. If the survival rates of immature and mature fish are identical, optimal harvesting can be implemented by means of a single TAC and a system of individual tradable harvesting quotas that can be traded on a one-to-one basis. Note that the regulator does not need to prescribe the allocation of quotas among the different age classes, as this is done by the quota market. This result is formally stated in the following proposition. 
X X S S on the overall number of fish harvested and implementing it by means of tradable harvesting quotas in numbers.
Proof: see Appendix C.
If, by contrast, the survival rates of immature and mature fish differ, the instrument has to be modified slightly. Harvesting quotas must then not be traded on a one-to-one basis among age classes, but on the basis of a constant "exchange rate" determined by the ratio of survival rates, as the following corollary to Proposition 5 states. In this setting, the harvesting quota may be thought of as a license to reduce the stock of fish of a particular age by no more than a specified amount. Eastern Baltic cod, for example, this exchange rate is 2.1 (see Section 5).
Application: Eastern Baltic Cod Fishery
The Eastern Baltic cod stock is historically the third largest stock in the North Atlantic here. This would imply a significant reduction of transaction costs connected to monitoring and enforcement of these regulations.
Data and specific functional forms
The parameterization of the population model to the eastern Baltic cod case is based on best available biological data. Age-specific abundance data, the proportion of mature fish per ageclass, and natural mortality rates are based on assessment data using a stochastic multispecies model (SMS; ICES 2008). The SMS is an advanced method applied in fish-stock assessment, which is routinely used in the Baltic. Compared to the more frequently used single-species virtual population analysis (VPA), it has the advantage of explicitly taking into account predation mortality as a density-dependent process. The weight of young immature fish , and calculate unit effort costs in terms of the average cost/price ratio.
For effort and cost, the data do not allow distinguishing between age classes. We therefore assume that harvesting functions and cost parameters are the same for immature and mature cod.
To estimate the parameters of the harvesting function (see Appendix A), we use the stock numbers from the ICES (2008) 
Optimization results
From the parameters given in Table 1 In order to assess the uncertainty involved in calculating the optimal steady state we perform the following sensitivity analysis: we calculate the optimal steady state for each combination of both the reference parameter set and the upper and lower boundaries of their confidence intervals (see Table 1 ). The resulting minimum and maximum steady-state values for the optimal steady state spawning stock are We perform the dynamic optimization using the reference parameter set reported in Table   1 . 11 The resulting optimal developments of the spawning stock and escapement of mature Eastern
24
Baltic cod are shown in Figure 1 . 12 According to the results, it is optimal to stop harvesting for three years, as in this period optimal escapement equals the spawning stock. After this period, harvesting is gradually increased to the steady-state values.
13 Figure 2 shows the optimal harvesting fee and the instantaneous profits per unit of harvest at the beginning and at the end of the harvesting seasons. For the transition period of three years, the optimal harvesting fee already exceeds the profit per unit of harvest at the beginning of the season, where harvesting costs are at a minimum, so that no fisherman would have an incentive to start fishing. After the transition period, the harvesting fee and the current profit at the end of the fishing season coincide (cf. condition 5). 14 Overall, the quota price is substantial, with values of almost 60 percent of the ex-vessel price of landed fish.
Figures 2 and 3 about here.
In order to study the sensitivity of optimal dynamics to changes in the parameter values, we perform the dynamic optimization with the two boundary values of the 90% confidence interval of the catchability parameter (Table 1) , while the other parameter values are set as in the reference case. The optimization results are shown in Figure 2 . The lower curves, for the 12 The developments of the stock and escapement of young immature cod are not shown, as over the whole time horizon complete escapement (i.e. zero harvesting) of the young immature cod is optimal. 13 The most rapid approach to constant escapement, which would be optimal in the corresponding biomass model with linear objective function (both in continuous and discrete time, Clark 1990 , Reed 1979 , is not optimal in the age-structured setting considered here. This result is similar to a model with multi-species interactions, where again the most rapid approach is generally not the optimal solution (Clark 1990, chapter 10) .
maximum value of catchability parameter, i.e. the case of low harvesting cost, are qualitatively similar to the curves for the reference parameter set shown in Figure 1 . However, we observe two quantitative differences: the period of zero harvest lasts only two years, and both the optimal steady-state stock and escapement are considerably lower. Also, steady-state harvest is lower than in the case of the reference parameter set.
In quantitative terms, the upper curves in Figure 3 , which display the optimal values for stock and escapement for the minimum value of the catchability parameter (i.e. high harvesting cost) differ from the reference case in that the period of zero harvest is considerably longer (eight years) and their steady-state values are much higher. Steady-state harvest, on the other hand, is lower than in the reference case. In addition, the optimal paths of stock and escapement differ in qualitative terms from the reference case. After the period of zero harvesting, the steady state is approached in damped oscillations with periods of "over-shooting" when stock and escapement exceed the steady-state values.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we set up an age-structured fishery model that allows us to distinguish spawning stock and non-spawning stock and to disentangle the problems of recruitment overfishing and growth overfishing. We have shown that, in general, harvest from spawning stock and from non-spawning stock has to be targeted in different ways, meaning that, except from special cases, immature fish and mature fish should be harvested in different quantities.
Specifically, we have identified conditions under which it is optimal to harvest mature (spawning) fish only.
Our study provides important policy conclusions. Firstly, the type of quota management currently implemented in most fisheries fails to solve the problem of growth overfishing, as quotas are expressed in terms of biomass. For this reason, most fisheries are additionally regulated by gear restrictions (e.g. mesh-size regulations) and minimum landing sizes. We have secondly shown that, although optimal harvesting quantities differ from one age class to another, optimal age-structured management can be implemented by means of setting a single TAC and by issuing or auctioning off tradable harvesting quotas, provided they are specified in terms of the number of fish harvested. The quota market will then efficiently allocate the TAC among the different age classes. One notable aspect of this result is that the quota market will thereby bring about an optimal age structure in the fish stock. This is an important difference to the conclusion from the "biomass" model, where the ecological effectiveness of management is guaranteed by setting the appropriate TAC, irrespective of whether quotas are tradable.
A practical implementation of fishery management requires quantifying the TAC or, with the price-based approach, quantifying the harvesting fee. As an illustration we have applied our age-structured model to the Eastern Baltic cod fishery. Here it turns out that the conditions for a zero-harvest policy for immature cod are satisfied. For the older cod, we have computed a time path for total allowable catch that maximizes the present value of resource rents. It involves zero harvesting for a period of three years (due to the linear objective function), then a period of gradually increasing TACs, and ultimately a yearly harvest substantially higher than current harvests. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis shows that current management is clearly not optimal. However, the sensitivity analysis also shows that the quantification of optimal TACs is subject to considerable uncertainty. One conceivable source of uncertainty is that our model is a single species model. Many species, including the Baltic cod, interact with other commercially valuable species. For example, Baltic cod feeds on sprat and herring, while the sprat feeds on cod eggs and larvae. Further research should therefore try to integrate species interaction into agestructured models to reduce the uncertainties and to allow for the development of an integrated policy regulating several commercial species simultaneously. 
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